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Abstract—Widespread and commercial usage of Wireless Sen-
sor Networks is kept back by the lack of strong and easy to
use security. The wide range of applications of WSNs implies
different and often contradictory security requirements. This
paper argues the need for a configurable security architecture for
WSNs and presents a methodology and software implementation
to determine the most resource efficient suite of security protocols
for a given application.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a long incubation period of intensive hardware and
software research, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are
slowly moving towards commercial usage: academic applica-
tions have been deployed for years in uncontrolled environ-
ments, in order to determine the problems that arise in WSN
deployments [1]. There are also larger scale, operational net-
works, like CitySense [2] which will provide a live coverage of
the environment. There is a lot of interest and hype regarding
WSNs however a major set-back which has not yet surfaced is
the lack of strong and easy to use security. Despite a plethora
of protocols in WSN literature, there are few actual usable
implementations.
The main problem with security is that an entire suite of
protocols is required: encryption, authentication, key manage-
ment just form the basic set, which is followed by a number of
protocols or techniques needed to defend against specific WSN
attacks. Furthermore, two separate WSN applications will have
different and often contradictory security requirements. As an
example, consider military and smart-home applications: using
the same cryptographic algorithms for both applications will
either be too weak for the former or too strong for latter, where
it would lead to waste of power and resources. This implies
that developing a static security architecture (as proposed in
[3]) is not ideal, and instead the security should be determined
for each particular application.
The subject of security configuration or management has
not received much attention in research. We have an approach
by Prasad and Alam [4] to select security primitives based
on the security level, which in turn is determined by the
application type. Ransom et al in [5] generate security models
for the network defined by the user’s parametrised description
of the application, and present each model with a list of
possible attacks, allowing the user to choose what he thinks
is the safest model. Finally, Peter et al present configKit [6],
designed to help application developers find the configuration
of security modules which resolves the hardware, energy and
security requirements of the designed application. A simpler
but more practical approach to security configuration is to use
a configurable cipher, like RC5, and employ different numbers
of rounds or key sizes, yielding different levels of security. An
approach is presented in [7].
Security configuration is the first step towards a proper
security architecture for sensor networks. The determined suite
of protocols needs to be incorporated into the application
code with as little interference as possible. What is required
is a basic modular security architecture built into the WSN
operating system, where specific security protocols can be
connected.
A configuration methodology that addresses some issues
omitted by the previous approaches is presented in section
II. The methodology is put to work in a scenario for medi-
cal applications. The configuration of specific WSN security
issues is discussed in section III. Section IV explains what a
complete architecture for WSNs should look like, and how the
security configuration is integrated into it. The paper concludes
in section V.
II. CONFIGURING SECURITY
The main concern of this paper is the difficulty of configur-
ing security in a wireless sensor network. As previously stated,
to perform this task extensive knowledge of the application,
of WSNs and security is required. In this section a process
that selects suitable security protocols for a given network
deployment is presented.
A. Parameters
The analysis of WSN security lead to the conclusion that a
set of parameters can be used to control the security require-
ments and identify protocols and schemes. These parameters
are application type, number of nodes, topology dynamics,
communication frequency, unattended functioning time, node
performance and timing constraints, which describe the net-
work model and the application, and power consumption per
packet, attacks, environment security, data security, ciphers,
semantic security, which are internal parameters and cannot
be controlled by a network user. However, through further
refinement, it is possible to express these internal parameters as
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Fig. 1. Software tool logic
functions of the application level parameters, in which case the
security of the sensor network can be entirely configured by
a non-expert user who only has knowledge of the application
space.
Attacks are used to objectively compare the security of two
similar protocols. A list of attacks and vulnerabilities has been
compiled and ordered on the effort put on the attacker. The list
in ascending order is: forward secrecy (FS), small group (SG),
unknown key share (UKS), impersonation by signature forgery
(SFImp), multiple session (MS), impersonation by forwarding
(FImp), man in the middle (MiM), impersonation (Imp), denial
of service (DoS), replay (Rep), key freshness (KF), type flaw
(TF), and every attack is tagged with a number that indicates
it’s position in the list: FS is 1 and TF is 11 (replay and
key freshness are considered to require the same effort). To
determine the security of a protocol (and allow comparison),
the values for all the attacks the protocol is vulnerable against
are summed, which results in the total vulnerability: the lower
this value, the more secure the protocol. Table I shows the
vulnerabilities for the considered key establishment protocols.
B. Selecting Security Protocols
As observed in the previous section, all the security re-
lated decisions can be based on a set of parameters from
application space, which allows a non-expert user to configure
the network security just by describing the application. This
facility is important, as the security requirements can change
if the network becomes mobile or if the number of nodes is
modified. To illustrate and test the concepts presented in this
paper, a security configuration tool has been implemented. The
application logic for the software tool is shown in figure 1.
The tool uses a graphical interface to gather the user input
that describes the application. This translates into the set of
application parameters that were detailed above. It has been
discussed that there are internal parameters that have to be
determined as a function of the first set of parameters. In the
application this is done with a generalised planning algorithm:
the initial states are the set of application parameters and the
goal is that all the parameters (application and internal) must
be resolved. The value of an unresolved parameter can be
determined only after all the dependencies are in turn resolved.
Once all the parameters are identified the suitable security
protocols can be selected from an underlying database. The
security configuration is based on the fact that every protocol
can be identified by a set of (parameter, value) pairs, which
can be matched by the application and internal parameters
deduced from the user input. This is shown in table II which
reflects the protocol described-by parameter relation of the
database.
C. Scenario
A scenario will better explain the way security is configured
based on application parameters. We consider a hospital where
every room has a WSN of less than one hundred nodes,
deployed on patients to monitor the vitals. Data should be
reported to a central computer from each sensor every second,
and the maximum time a patient is considered to stay in the
hospital under monitoring is one month. The nodes are cheap
and the hardware is low end, they are powered by two AA
batteries giving roughly 3000 mAH each. The nodes should
be mobile to allow patients to move around, and common
sense dictates that a clustered topology should be used, with
each patient being a cluster of sensors.
Since this is a medical application a high level of security
is required and we consider the environment public (although
it could also be trusted). The public environment eliminates
master keys, and the clustered topology, hierarchical com-
munication and node mobility restrict the choices to using
server shared keys. Key establishment protocols are restricted
to centralised distribution, and the safest protocol is found
to be Wide Mouthed Frog, vulnerable only to multisession
attacks. Next, for data security, the ciphers are determined
from the performance, timing constraints and security level:
we have to eliminate public algorithms and as medical ap-
plications require a high level of security we are left with
AES. Therefore, we can choose the ZigBee security stack, as
the others use either RC5 or Skipjack. We can also use the
ZigBee data authentication, but for broadcast authentication
our current selection of protocols does not provide one that
uses AES. Therefore, the tool will present all the broadcast
authentication protocols and the user can select one.
If the network was deployed with the same requirements but
used for environment monitoring a low security level would
be acceptable therefore the security tool would be able to
select RC5 and Skipjack too. The choice between ZigBee,
TinySec, MiniSec and SPINS would be made on the maximum
consumption per packet and on the semantic security. The
expected number of packets sent by a node is at least 2678400
(one packet per second a month), which eliminates TinySec
TABLE I
ATTACKS AND TOTAL VULNERABILITY FOR KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOLS
NS sym OR WMF KU Shamir NS PK X509 SKKE DH MTI MQV STS
Attacks KF, Rep TF MS FS Imp KF, Imp SFImp FS,
UKS
FS,
Imp,
MiM
UKS,
SG
UKS UKS
Vulnera-
bility
20 11 5 1 8 18 4 4 16 5 3 3
TABLE II
CHARACTERISING SECURITY PROTOCOLS WITH NETWORK PARAMETERS
Protocol category and list of influ-
encing parameters
Protocols Parameter values, correspond to parameters in the
first column
Key Predistribution: Max
Environment Security, Nr. Nodes,
Topology, Dynamics, Comm.
Pattern
Pairwise Hostile, <100, Mesh, Static, Random
Master Trusted, <100, all, all, all
KDS Hostile, all, Centralised and Cluster, all, Hierarch
Probabilistic Public, >100, Mesh, all, Random
Key Establishment: Topology,
Comm Pattern, Ciphers
Sym Centr Transport Centralised and Cluster, Hierarch, Sym
Sym Distr Transport Mesh, Random, Sym
Sym Transport with PK Mesh, Radom, Asym
Sym Agreement Mesh, Random, Sym
Asym Agreement Mesh, Random, Asym (STS uses both)
Data sec and Auth: Cipher,
Semantic Security, Consumption per
Packet, Attacks
ZigBee AES, 240, N/A, -
TinySec Skipjack, 216, 0.000176mAH, Replay
MiniSec Skipjack, 264, 0.000167mAH, -
SNEP (from SPINS) RC5, N/A, 0.000188mAH, -
Broadcast auth: cipher, attacks µTESLA (from SPINS) RC5, DoS
whose IV of 16 bits overflows after 65536 packets. The
maximum consumption per packet is 0.00224 mAH. Since
MiniSec has a packet consumption of 0.000167 mAH and
SPINS 0.000188 mAH, both protocols can be used. They are
both resilient to replay attacks so the tool will recommend
both, although since MiniSec is the only one implemented, it
should be the only choice.
III. SECURITY PARTICULARITIES FOR SENSOR NETWORKS
The protocols considered so far for security configuration
are mainly for traditionally understood communication se-
curity: confidentiality, authentication and integrity, and key
management. Wireless sensor networks are subject to other
threats that can’t be countered with basic security primitives;
there are two issues which are still an open problem: routing
security, namely, worm holes, and aggregation security.
Routing worm holes are high speed data tunnels created
by an attacker with two endpoints in different parts of the
network, which give nodes around the two ends of the tunnel
the false impression that they are neighbours. Basic security
primitives have no effect on the attack, as packets are copied
entirely and dispatched through the tunnel. The effect is a
disruption of the routing protocol. The authors’ conclusion
is that measures to detect worm holes require centralisation
of topology information, like geographic position of nodes,
or distance between them [8]. As worm holes are an open
problem, they are left out of the configuration process.
Aggregation reduces and evens traffic throughout the net-
work as aggregator nodes (branching nodes in the aggregation
tree), using an aggregation function (e.g. sum, average), will
summarise the data from children nodes instead of forwarding
all the messages towards the sink. Depending on the level of
trust in nodes the following levels of threat are identified:
• all the nodes are trusted - could work with no additional
security, but authentication should be used to prevent in-
transit data alteration;
• aggregator nodes are compromised;
• any node can be compromised.
Focus in literature is on the second and third levels. Against
aggregator compromise there is an approach by Hu and Evans
[9]. Aggregation security is very different if there is no trust in
all network nodes, which can be the case if nodes are subject
to capture, or their sensed values can be influenced by chang-
ing the environment around them. To detect misbehaving or
malfunctioning nodes, a special algorithms is used to validate
data for each type of aggregation function, as discussed in
[10]. Complete security protocols are based on an aggregate-
commit-prove sequence, as presented in [11], [12].
There is a fourth approach to aggregation security, in
systems where data theft needs to be prevented. Data confi-
dentiality is required and to eliminate the overhead of hop-by-
hop en/decryption homomorphic ciphers are used [13], [14].
With homomorphic ciphers, E(m1⊗m2) = E(m1)⊕E(m2),
where E is the encryption function, m the message, ⊗ the
group operation for message space and ⊕ the group operation
for ciphertext space; therefore using homomorphic ciphers,
aggregation can be performed directly on ciphertexts.
Five levels of aggregation security are considered and classi-
fied according to the amount of communication and processing
overhead, and the type of environment where the network is
to be deployed.They are shown in the graph in figure 2 which
connects the selection of aggregation security solutions with
Fig. 2. Levels of aggregation security based on environment type and amount
of communication and processing overhead
the configuration parameters introduced in section II-A.
IV. INTEGRATED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
For reasons previously stated, wireless sensor networks
should not have a static security architecture but a modular
and dynamic one, where the most efficient protocol suite can
be easily connected to the application code. In the following,
the development process illustrated in figure 3 is elaborated
upon, in order to determine specific architectural issues.
Following instructions from [15] it was established that
security for a specific type of messages should be determined
from message source network layer, application requirements
and overall security configuration. When the application code
is being developed, the programmer should indicate what type
of data needs security, and, preferably, what class of security
protocols should be applied. In order to minimise code changes
the use of annotations is encouraged. In addition, the developer
should indicate (also through annotations) what the individual
communication layers are. This will be used to determine on
which layer a specific message originates. This completes the
role of the application developer.
Before installing (or updating) sensor firmware, the user
must configure the security using the tool presented in the
previous section. This tool can generate a security descriptor
giving information about specific security protocols to be used
with the application. With this descriptor and the information
provided through annotations, the security protocols can be
retrieved from a generic repository and connected to the
application code.
For a simplified architecture only the basic security ser-
vices are considered: confidentiality, authentication and key
management. The complexity comes from being able to apply
the first two at different layers in the communication stack,
with different levels of security: for example, the application
might demand link-layer security with a network key, but
also a higher level of security with pair-wise keys for the
application message. Performing security processing of the
data on every communication layer can lead to redundancy
and great resource waste in sensor networks. As described
by Filman and Linden in [16], a centralised approach to
security has many advantages. Security agents can interact
in key sharing, voting algorithms, intrusion detection, etc.
So redundancy can be eliminated by processing the contents
of the message only once, with the highest determined level
of security. This implies that the processing should happen
at the lowest communication layer possible, and no more
security operations are performed afterwards. Since MAC
layers often have specific headers it is best to perform security
processing right above this. The downside would be that
performance hacks as employed in TinySec [17], where the
message is processed while sending packet preamble to reduce
timing overhead, will not be possible. Complex techniques
could overcome this, using a scheduler and delayed message
processing, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Before dispatching the message to the MAC layer, infor-
mation should be included to indicate what security services
need to be performed when the message is received at the
other end.
The second part of the architecture is key management. A
single entity should manage a database of keys, which are
obtained or updated using key establishment protocols. An
interesting subject is how key predistribution can be automated
for large batches of nodes, by installing keys in predefined
addresses in the compiled binary.
The main concern of this envisioned modular architecture
is to interfere and change existing code as little as possible.
The constraints placed on application code are the annotations.
Also, security protocols that provide a certain service should
implement a predefined service interface. This means that
available protocols like TinySec or MiniSec [18] would need
to be restructured and refactored to fit into the architecture.
These observations are currently explored by the authors
towards the implementation of the security architecture for
the TinyOS operating system.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper envisions a modular security architecture that
can provide strong and easy to use security for all the dif-
ferent applications of wireless sensor networks. In addition, it
provides a concrete methodology together with a software im-
plementation to determine the most efficient suite of security
protocols that satisfies the requirements of a given application.
The authors are currently working on implementing the
envisioned security architecture in the TinyOS sensor node
operating system.
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Fig. 3. Proposed deployment process for security integration
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